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Christian F. Rostbøll
Emancipation or
accommodation?
Habermasian vs. Rawlsian deliberative
democracy
Abstract The development of the theory of deliberative democracy has
culminated in a synthesis between Rawlsian political liberalism and Haber-
masian critical theory. Taking the perspective of conceptions of freedom, this
article argues that this synthesis is unfortunate and obscures some important
differences between the two traditions. In particular, the idea of internal
autonomy, which was an important, implicit idea in the ideology critique of
the earlier Habermas, falls out of view. There is no room for this dimension
of freedom in political liberalism and it has largely disappeared from the
later Habermas. In so far as others have followed Rawls and Habermas,
deliberative democratic theory has converged around a less critical and
more accommodationist view of freedom. If we want to keep deliberative
democracy as a critical theory of contemporary society, we should resist
this convergence. Our starting point should not be ‘the fact of reasonable
pluralism’ but rather ‘the fact of unreflective acquiescence’. This article
argues for incorporating internal autonomy in a complex theory of freedom
to which deliberative democracy should be normatively committed.
Key words autonomy · deliberative democracy · freedom · Jürgen
Habermas · ideology critique · John Rawls
The writings of Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls are the two main
contemporary sources of inspiration for theorists of deliberative demo-
cracy.1 Most deliberative democrats draw on the works of one or both
of them.2 Indeed, the development of the theory of deliberative demo-
cracy has culminated in a synthesis between Rawlsian political liberalism
and Habermasian critical theory. This article argues that this is unfor-
tunate, because it obscures some fundamental differences between the
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two traditions. Although Rawlsians and Habermasians discuss some dis-
agreements, these are seen as remaining ‘within the bounds of a family
quarrel’.3 I believe that the disagreements are actually rooted in a more
fundamental difference between the two traditions, a difference that lies
in their distinct normative commitments and emphases with regard to
dimensions of freedom. Generally speaking, Rawls’ view of freedom is
indebted to a liberal tradition of toleration or accommodation (going
back to Locke and Madison), while Habermas’ stems from a critical
tradition, in the lineage of Kant and Marx,4 that views freedom as a
matter of enlightenment and emancipation from all forms of oppres-
sion, including those forms that originate from false consciousness.5
These different conceptions of freedom inform two very different under-
standings of the role and aim of deliberation: one of accommodating
people with irreconcilable views and another of deliberation as a matter
of learning and emancipation.
In their 1995 discussion,6 Habermas and Rawls identified freedom
as an issue they disagree on. However, this discussion focused on modern
versus ancient liberties, or negative versus political freedom.7 Habermas
criticizes Rawls for over-emphasizing the negative liberties at the expense
of public autonomy, while Rawls criticizes Habermas for doing the
opposite.8 Deliberative democrats have concentrated on reconciling these
two dimensions of freedom only.9 But this is insufficient. An important
part of the critical edge of the theory of deliberative democracy is that
it problematizes the status of the preferences people happen to have. It
does not regard preferences and interests as brute facts that uncritically
can serve as input to legitimate democratic decision-making.10 The recon-
ciliation misses an important third dimension of freedom that concerns
the free formation of individual opinions, or internal autonomy. I argue
that it is this dimension of freedom that distinguishes Habermas from
Rawls, and that this dimension of freedom implicitly informs their
discussion of individual and political freedom. This third dimension of
freedom needs to be thematized and integrated with discussions of the
other two.
Indeed, in his later writings Rawls moves closer to the idea of
freedom as merely a matter of living in accordance with one’s individu-
ally determined comprehensive doctrine, while Habermas has distanced
himself from the radically emancipatory view of freedom, and especi-
ally from his roots in the critical theory tradition of ideology critique
(Ideologiekritik). In so far as others have followed the two, deliberative
democratic theory has converged around a less critical and more
accommodationist view of freedom. I shall show that, appearances
notwithstanding, there remain some crucial divergences between Rawls
and Habermas. I further argue that theories of deliberative democracy
should resist moving too close to the accommodationist pole.11
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The divergences between the two traditions also reveal an unresolved
tension in theories of deliberative democracy. There is a tension between
the heritage of ideology critique, with its concern for emancipation from
false consciousness, and the heritage of toleration liberalism, with its
concern for letting people decide for themselves what constitutes the
good life and the sources of morality. I see this as a tension between two
dimensions of freedom, between the free and rational formation of indi-
vidual beliefs (or internal autonomy), and negative freedom. Resolution
of this tension requires a systematic exploration of the multiple dimen-
sions of freedom to which deliberative democracy should be normatively
committed. The challenge is to develop a more comprehensive theory
of freedom that, where possible, integrates the different dimensions and,
where integration is not possible, elucidates the conflicts.12
This article makes explicit the fundamental difference between the
two traditions in terms of their views of freedom and autonomy and
discusses whether they can and should be combined. My aim is thus
both interpretative and normative. The first section makes explicit the
dimension of freedom that is prioritized by the Rawlsian diagnosis of
contemporary society as characterized by ‘the fact of reasonable plural-
ism’. The second section contrasts Rawlsian and Habermasian views of
reasonableness and argues that these express different dimensions of
freedom. In the third section, I focus on Habermasian versions of delib-
erative democracy, particularly in order to argue that deliberative demo-
crats should not sever their roots in critical theory and ideology critique.
I Rawls: the accommodation of reasonable doctrines and
negative freedom
The focus on toleration and accommodation is a relatively recent develop-
ment related to the Rawlsians’ discovery of ‘the fact of reasonable
pluralism’. Rawls himself characterizes the main difference between his
1971 A Theory of Justice and his 1993 Political Liberalism as an adjust-
ment for this fact.13 A society characterized by reasonable pluralism is
one in which the citizens hold irreconcilable but reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrines; that is, they hold irreconcilable views about metaphysics,
the meaning of life, the sources of morality, and the like.14 Reasonable
pluralism is central to the Rawlsian view not only because of the fact
that citizens hold different views of the good life. The aim is not merely
to take us beyond a classical, perfectionist political philosophy of the
good life to a Kantian, neutralist one that recognizes that people have
different ideas about what constitutes human happiness or fulfillment.
Reasonable pluralism refers to a more fundamental disagreement, one
that concerns both issues of the good life and the reasons behind the
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norms that guide citizens’ common life.15 This fundamental disagreement
is not seen as a regrettable fact, which citizens can overcome through
enlightenment or learning. Rather, ‘it is a permanent feature of the public
culture of democracy’ (PL 36).
Rawls regards the fundamental challenge of contemporary society as
one of accommodating citizens who hold different world-views. ‘[T]he
problem of political liberalism is: How is it possible that there might exist
over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly
divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and
moral doctrines?’ (PL xviii). Political liberalism takes citizens’ doctrines
as being beyond challenge; it ‘does not attack or criticize any reasonable
view’ (PL xix).16 Note that political liberalism does not criticize in its
role as a theory; it is not a critical theory in relation to comprehensive
doctrines. In so far as the function of political philosophy is concerned,
Rawls’ premise is the idea of applying ‘the principles of toleration to
philosophy itself’, which entails leaving it ‘to citizens themselves to settle
the questions of religion, philosophy, and morals in accordance with
views they freely affirm’ (PL 154). And by leaving citizens to decide for
themselves, Rawls means non-publicly, not democratically or intersub-
jectively.
This places us squarely on the terrain of toleration or Reformation
liberalism.17 By toleration liberalism, I mean a liberalism whose main
concern is to accommodate citizens who hold different and irreconcil-
able views. Its primary normative commitment is the protection of the
negative liberty to live according to one’s own ideas. This liberalism has
been contrasted with a liberalism whose central ideal is autonomy, and
is connected to the Enlightenment project.18 Rawls explicitly denies that
political liberalism belongs to the latter project (PL xviii).19 According
to political liberalism, people should be left to themselves with their com-
prehensive views even (apparently) if they hold them non-autonomously.
Neither Rawls nor Joshua Cohen believes reasonable pluralism is
defective, that it is something citizens should attempt to overcome. It
should not, for example, be seen as a result of oppression and therefore
‘remediable’ by emancipation. Rather, it is a product of what Rawls calls
the ‘burdens of judgment’ (PL 54ff.).20 Judgment of both theoretical and
practical issues is so complex that even reasonable people are unlikely
to reach the same conclusions. For Rawls, negative liberty is grounded
in the fact that even perfectly reasonable and rational citizens will
disagree on many fundamental issues. Thus, he says, ‘reasonable persons
see that the burdens of judgment set limits on what can be reasonably
justified to others, and so they endorse some form of liberty of conscience
and freedom of thought’ (PL 61; emphasis added). There is no expec-
tation that the divisions resulting from the burdens of judgment will be
overcome; the aim is to answer how justice is possible for citizens ‘who
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remain profoundly divided’ (PL 4; emphasis added). There is a clear
Madisonian strand here. According to Rawls, reasonable pluralism is
‘the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human reason at work
within the background of enduring free institutions’ (PL 4, cf. 37). Like
Madison’s factions, the price of defeating comprehensive doctrines is the
violation of negative freedom, a cure worse than the disease.21 Rawls’
focus, though, unlike Madison’s, is not on interest groups but on ideo-
logical-cultural groups, paradigmatically religious groups.22
Rawls argues that the fact of reasonable pluralism should result in
our acceptance not only of the idea that people decide on issues concern-
ing their private life individually, but also that ‘citizens individually
decide for themselves in what way the public political conception [of
justice] all affirm is related to their own more comprehensive views’ (PL
38). This means we are also prohibited from criticizing how others come
to hold their particular political views. For by ‘individually deciding’,
Rawls is saying more than that the individual should be the final judge
of her or his political views; he is saying that citizens should have no
public discussion whatsoever at the comprehensive level.23
In terms of the relationship between the different dimensions of
freedom, there are two remarkable features of Rawls’ view. First, the
negative dimension of freedom is clearly given pride of place. Second,
reasonable citizens are seen as willing to submit their comprehensive
views and life-plans to the overarching idea of respect for the equal
negative liberty of everyone else. It is unclear either what the source of
this respect is, or why respect should have priority over any one compre-
hensive view. Insight into this cannot be gained from public deliberation,
for in Rawls’ view reasonable pluralism means that citizens already
agree on certain fundamentals (such as respect), that they are reasonable
from the start, and only refer to presently held beliefs. A person who
observes the disagreement that results from the burdens of judgment is
given no reason why this should lead him or her to accept the norm of
equal negative liberty rather than force everyone else to live according
to his or her preferred comprehensive view. Furthermore, he or she
would have no way of knowing the exact boundaries of negative liberty.
In order for a norm such as respect for the equal negative liberty of
everyone to have precedence over our other commitments and aims, the
overriding epistemic authority of that norm needs to be identified. But
the focus on reasonable pluralism does not allow for such an epistemic
authority that can trump the other aspects of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines.24
In political liberalism, negative freedom is disconnected from other
dimensions of freedom. It is detached from freedom as the gaining of
insights regarding the norms that regulate our common interaction. The
acceptance of negative freedom and the determination of its bounds are
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not seen as products of learning, but as given premises. Moreover, nega-
tive liberty is disconnected from freedom as collective self-determination,
since negative liberty is seen as a constraint on, rather than a product of,
the common process of deliberation that ought to be the basis of politi-
cal decision-making.
Rawls’ view of the challenges facing modern society entails a con-
ception of freedom that excludes the possibility that freedom could be
augmented if fundamental ideas were discussed and criticized. Or more
precisely, this is true of freedom in the political sense – which is not the
same as political freedom, but is freedom as a specifically political, as
opposed to comprehensive, value. In other words, from the perspective
of a political conception of justice, freedom cannot refer to the process
of the free formation of comprehensive views. On the contrary, the
Rawlsian conception of freedom prevents the thematization of this
dimension of freedom. Internal autonomy is outside the field of politi-
cal philosophy (and beyond the idea of public reason, as we shall see).
This reveals the clear link between the Rawlsian view and the tradition
of negative freedom.25 According to political liberalism, citizens’ compre-
hensive views are off-limits to politics. Since they are the products of
freedom, it would be a violation of freedom to criticize them. So people’s
views of truth and morality are a non-public matter protected by a prin-
ciple of toleration or negative freedom. The dimension of freedom that
is off-limits as a result of this point of departure common to Rawlsian
deliberative democrats concerns the free formation of fundamental views.
The focus on reasonable pluralism leads to a priority of negative freedom
over free opinion formation or internal autonomy. In short, it provides
for a one-dimensional view of freedom.
In sum, the conception of freedom underlying political liberalism
implicitly assumes that all interaction, and especially interaction in the
political sphere, is a threat to freedom. It thereby obscures the distinction
between free and non-coercive interaction, on the one hand, and violent
and manipulative interference, on the other. It is therefore unsuitable as
a conception on the basis of which we can see public deliberation as an
exercise of freedom. To understand public deliberation properly, we
must make the distinction obscured by negative liberty theorists. When
we deliberate, there is a sense in which we interfere with one another,
but we do not force one another to do anything. The freedom of the
deliberative process cannot be understood in purely negative terms,
since it requires the presence of and interaction with others. It does,
however, include a negative element, since it must be free from force
and manipulation.26
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II Public reason and reasonableness
Public reason is the idea that (ostensibly) connects Rawls’ political liber-
alism to the theory of deliberative democracy. I shall discuss the idea
of public reason in relation to the concomitant idea of reasonableness.
Rawlsian deliberative democrats begin with reasonable pluralism, not
merely pluralism. I suggest that the Rawlsian understanding of reason-
ableness exemplifies and exhibits an important difference to Haber-
masian critical theory in terms of freedom. This difference lies behind
the divergent ideas of content reasonableness and form reasonableness.
Content reasonableness
Content reasonableness entails a constraint on what is an admissible
content of contributions to public deliberation. In general, Rawlsians
favour such a constraint, while Habermasians reject it.27 There are two
parts to Rawls’ own understanding of content reasonableness. First he
says that the reasons we offer for political actions must be such that we
‘reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those
reasons’.28 Then he suggests that such reasons are those that refer to ‘a
family of political conceptions of justice’.29 Comprehensive views, which
are any reference to the whole truth, are excluded from public reason.
Moreover, anything controversial is also excluded. In public deliberation,
‘we are to appeal only to presently accepted beliefs’ (PL 224). Reason-
able pluralism and the burdens of judgment constitute the background
and justification for this requirement (PL 58f.). Because people cannot
agree on issues of truth, they should stick to political values and tolerate
different views. By not appealing to the whole truth, citizens recognize
one another’s comprehensive views as reasonable, if mistaken (PL 127).
I have several objections to content reasonableness as a constraint
on deliberation. At the most general level, content reasonableness under-
mines the very point of common deliberation, because it sets reasonable-
ness as a pre-deliberative constraint and not as a product of deliberation.
In many ways it is difficult to see Rawls’ idea of public reason as an
ideal for a process of public deliberation at all. Rawls’ notion of public
reason does not rely on the resources intrinsic to public deliberation as
a dialogical process of reaching reasonable outcomes. There is no taking
into account that citizens need to hear what others have to say before
they can know what is reasonable. The assumption is that citizens know
prepolitically what might count as reasonable arguments and outcomes.
But then there is no need for any actual processes of exchanging infor-
mation and reasons.30 All that is required of citizens is that they make
arguments that they believe others can accept as reasonable persons.
This might involve private or internal deliberation, but it does not
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require a public process of forming one’s opinions in light of what others
have to say.
There is an interesting parallel to Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the
requirements of public reason, a parallel which Rawls himself acknowl-
edges (PL 219f.). In On the Social Contract, Rousseau asks citizens to
vote, not in accordance with what they want, but in accordance with
what they think the general will is.31 If the vote were to take place after
a process of public deliberation in which all have learned what the others
think, I would have no objections. But for Rawls, public reason is about
voting for what one thinks others would also find reasonable. Moreover,
since people are prohibited from expressing what they need and want,
there is no way to learn about others’ needs, interests, and desires. All
we get from the voting according to public reason is an aggregation of
what various citizens believe might be acceptable to each other. But the
point of deliberation cannot be to abstract from the needs, interests, and
opinions people actually have. Rather, the purpose should be to learn
these things in order to figure out which need- and interest-claims have
merit and what opinions are backed by good reasons. The aim of deliber-
ation should not be to reject partial views or egoistic interest tout court,
but to screen out those that cannot be justified or generalized in a process
of public deliberation.32
A primary problem with the content reasonableness constraint is
that it does not consider deliberation as a process; a process that when
stylized can be seen as involving stages of (1) presentation of infor-
mation, claims, ideas, and opinions; (2) arguments pro and con; and (3)
agreement or decision-making. It is not necessary that claims and new
ideas be reasonable in the presentation stage – we often cannot know
whether claims and new ideas are reasonable until we have heard what
others have to say. What matters is that the final decisions are reason-
able and acceptable to all. When deliberation is not seen as a process,
then its value as a form of learning also falls out of sight. And in order
to see the full significance of public deliberation, we should see it as a
learning process. Before I enter the deliberative process, I do not know
what others think and want, or what I exactly think and want. And,
essentially, we do not know what we would want to do together. When
we first enter the deliberative process, we cannot know what others
would find reasonable and legitimate. All these are things we learn in
the process of deliberation, by speaking and listening to others, by
presenting our needs, interests, and opinions, by finding reasons that we
learn whether others can accept, by raising objections to reasons we
cannot accept, and so on. Those reasons that survive a non-distorted
deliberative process are reasonable and acceptable.
The lack of concern for deliberation as a learning process can fruit-
fully be connected to a lack of normative commitment to freedom as
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internal autonomy or freedom as the opportunity to form one’s politi-
cal opinions on the basis of the best available information and reasons.
The former can also be seen as neglect of a certain aspect of political
autonomy, namely that if citizens are to rule themselves they must first
ascertain what they really want, both individually and collectively.
There are some further implications regarding freedom that can be
drawn from the way Rawls construes content reasonableness. These can
be seen from two different angles: one regards which view of freedom is
taken as the point of departure, the other regards what citizens hope to
achieve from deliberation in terms of freedom. I have already dealt with
the starting point of freedom as a matter of respecting people’s irrecon-
cilable comprehensive doctrines. Regarding the second aspect, deliber-
ation is not seen as a way for citizens to overcome their reasonable
differences, or to emancipate themselves from their misconceptions.
Rather, it is regarded as a means for coming to some kind of agreement
despite enduring differences. A conservative bias can be detected in
Rawls’ insistence that citizens must refer only to presently accepted
beliefs. Public reason is not a means of overcoming prejudices, entrenched
meanings, ideologies, or any of the other issues that concern critical
theorists. As we saw, Rawls claims that excluding comprehensive views
or the whole truth from public reason is a way of respecting each other
as reasonable. But this also excludes the possibility of helping one another
to overcome our prejudices, misconceptions, or ideological delusions.
Reasonableness as a content constraint favors the protection of the
negative freedom to determine one’s own views over the autonomous,
intersubjective formation of those views.33
Form reasonableness
Now distinguish reasonableness of content from the idea of reasonable-
ness of form. This is a distinction between what is said and how it is
said. As an example of reasonableness as a constraint on content I have
mentioned the Rawlsian idea of the political. As examples of constraints
on the form of deliberation we might say that it is unreasonable to use
manipulation, deception, and threats. Of course threats concern what
is said as well as how it is said. But excluding threats from deliberation
does not mean excluding certain kinds of reasons, but avoiding what
are not properly reasons. The Rawlsians are concerned with ‘the kind
of reasons that should be given’ in deliberation,34 and not merely with
the idea that reasons, as opposed to threats, for example, should be given.
So by reasonableness of form, then, I am thinking about what it means
to distinguish, for instance, between arguing and bargaining. In argumen-
tation, the participants are allowed only to seek to rationally motivate
each other, i.e. to make the other agree on the basis of the merits of the
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case and nothing external to it. The only force that is supposed to count
in argument is, in Habermas’ famous phrase, ‘the peculiarly constraint-
free force of the better argument’.35 Arguing becomes bargaining when
the participants start threatening one another or offering one another
rewards external to the case at hand. When A bargains with B, A tries
to influence B by means of positive or negative sanctions. A is here
trying to influence B by controlling his or her situation. By contrast,
when A argues with B, A tries to come to an understanding with B. A
is here trying to rationally motivate B, not by controlling her or his situ-
ation, but by attempting to affect her or his intentions.36 In this case, a
reasonableness constraint would be one that required the participants
to offer only reasons rather than threats or rewards.37 I am not saying
that a deliberative democracy can only accept strict argument as opposed
to bargaining, but I am stressing how discussions of this issue differ from
discussions of constraints on content of reasons within argument. And
restrictions of content and form can be seen as manifesting emphases
on different dimensions of freedom, as we shall see below.
The processes of political opinion- and will-formation could never
be restricted to rational argumentation – that would overburden citizens
and no decisions would be made – but must also include bargaining and
voting.38 The aspiration for deliberative democrats should be that when
bargaining and voting are necessary, the conditions and procedures are
fair and have been justified and accepted as such in rational argumen-
tation.39 Thus, deliberative processes cannot be reduced to argumenta-
tion but the latter is the fundamental form of deliberation.
Although Habermas has carefully distinguished between different
forms of communication,40 he has not articulated the requirements of
using only arguments as a matter of reasonableness or as a virtue. Never-
theless, in the Habermasian framework it would clearly be an advan-
tage if citizens limited themselves to using only arguments, rather than
threats or other resources external to the issue under discussion. Still, it
is important to see – also in order to understand his view of freedom –
that Habermas’ project never has been to tell people that they ought
to argue. Such a moralistic outlook lies far from the idea of a critical
theory.41 His theories of communicative action, discourse ethics, and
deliberative politics have been more concerned with the conditions and
procedures of deliberation than with the virtues of the participants.42
How, in terms of dimensions of freedom, does the concern with form
differ from the concern with content of deliberation? The answer to
this question shows an essential and consequential difference between
Rawlsians and Habermasians.
A core idea in Habermas is that people interpret their needs and
form their identities, desires, and opinions in communication, or inter-
subjectively. And when this communication is distorted, the processes
716
Philosophy & Social Criticism 34 (7)
 © 2008 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at Copenhagen University Library on August 18, 2008 http://psc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
of identity- and opinion-formation do not take place rationally and
autonomously. So the concern for the form of communication is a
concern that the formation of identities, need-interpretations, interest-
articulation, and opinion- and will-formation all happen rationally and
autonomously. The dimension of freedom that comes to the fore here
is not the right to form one’s comprehensive views individually or non-
publicly, as in Rawlsian content reasonableness, but the ideal of forming
one’s views in communication free from all forces other than that of the
better argument. Both these dimensions of freedom can be seen as
negative conceptions, since they both protect citizens from something.
The constraint on content protects citizens against discussion of their
comprehensive views. The constraint on form protects citizens against
all forces other than the better argument. But the Habermasian view
cannot be purely negative, since we need others to be free. ‘Because
persons are individuated only by way of socialization, the freedom of
one individual cannot be tied to the freedom of everybody else in a
purely negative way, through reciprocal restrictions.’43 The two dimen-
sions can also both be positively formulated. The constraint on content
is concerned with the freedom to determine one’s own comprehensive
views. The constraint on form is concerned with the freedom rationally
and intersubjectively to form one’s opinion and will; in other words, its
positive aim is internal autonomy.
Thus, the Habermasian view shifts the focus away from reasonable-
ness as a virtue of citizens to a concern for the social conditions under
which people form their views. We move from using restricting the
admissible content of reasons as a screening mechanism to a critique
of social conditions and procedures of deliberation. I believe this point
relates to Habermas’ roots in critical theory and in particular ideology
critique and therefore turn to that issue.
III Habermas: criticism, not tolerance
In his early The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas
reproaches John Stuart Mill for demanding ‘not criticism but tolerance’.44
What Mill lacks, according to Habermas, is an idea of a universal interest
to which criticism can refer as criterion. It is exactly the search for a
way to solve the problem of how a plurality of competing interests could
converge in a general interest that has animated Habermas’ writings
since 1962.45 The theories of communicative action and discourse ethics
are aimed at discovering a normative potential and a criterion to which
we can refer despite our differences. This is not the place to go into the
details of these theoretical developments. What interests me is to make
explicit Habermas’ normative commitments, especially in terms of his
717
Rostbøll: Emancipation or accommodation
 © 2008 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at Copenhagen University Library on August 18, 2008 http://psc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
view of freedom, and show how they contrast with those of Rawlsian
models of deliberative democracy.
A main difference between Habermas and the Rawlsians is that
Habermas’ theory does not stand back from criticizing metaphysical
doctrines. Habermas is still interested not merely in tolerance but in
criticism: ‘Philosophy should not merely accept established convictions
but must also be able to judge them by the standards of a rational
conception of justice.’46 This conception of justice, however, is not a
substantial one determined by the theoretician or philosopher who then
imposes it from without on the citizens as subjects.47 Rather, the criti-
cism is aimed at convictions only indirectly; it is primarily focused on
procedures and conditions: the procedure of which the convictions are
the product and the conditions under which they were formed. But,
veritably, it is a conception that must be the product of reason, albeit a
procedural reason. This is a central Kantian element in Habermas. Thus,
in the preface to Between Facts and Norms, Habermas says that moder-
nity ‘depends on a procedural reason, that is, on a reason that puts itself
on trial’.48 Procedural reason should be distinguished from and substi-
tute for essentialist Platonic reason and natural law – as well as from
unreason and relativism. Rawls takes exception to such a view. It is too
comprehensive, he thinks, because it criticizes comprehensive views
and asks citizens to replace their comprehensive views with procedural
reason.49 The question is whether deliberative democracy can do without
a commitment to procedural reason. I think not.
Consider two important dimensions of freedom involved in Habermas’
view of the 1990s when he returns to democratic theory in a compre-
hensive manner.50 First, the reason for criticizing established convictions
can be seen as grounded in a concern that the latter, even if citizens see
them as their own, are not reflectively and freely endorsed. Such convic-
tions are not freely endorsed when they are not the product of insights
gained in free and public deliberation. Secondly, Habermas always
connects the idea of criticism with an idea of public autonomy. For criti-
cism to avoid becoming paternalistic or authoritarian, it must be part
of and speak to the common exercise of political freedom in processes
of public deliberation. Both of these dimensions of freedom are combined
in what Habermas admits to be the ‘dogmatic core’ of his theory: ‘the
idea of autonomy according to which human beings act as free subjects
only insofar as [1] they obey just those laws they give themselves [2] in
accordance with insights they have acquired intersubjectively.’51 In order
to be autonomous, citizens must not only give laws to themselves but
must do so on the basis of the best available reasons. Rawls’ notion of
full autonomy, which is a specifically political value, includes the first,
but it excludes the second because of his reluctance to criticize compre-
hensive doctrines.52 Thus, we do find an idea of public autonomy in
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Rawls, but it differs from Habermas’ view in not being concerned with
how citizens come to hold the views that make them support some legal
norms and public policies over others. I see this ‘how’ as a matter of
internal autonomy or lack thereof.
Habermas’ view is more comprehensive than Rawls’ purports to be,
because it requires that the laws we give to ourselves must be based on
insights that are the product of what we might call comprehensive
deliberation, i.e. deliberation that may include all issues. In terms of
autonomy, it is more comprehensive because it requires that when
citizens assent to a law they do so on the basis of insights gained in-
public deliberation and not merely on the basis of their publicly non-
criticizable comprehensive views. But in Habermas, it is only the reasons
for supporting laws that are publicly discussed and scrutinized, not
citizens’ private life-projects. Habermas’ theory seeks to be comprehen-
sive only in the sense in which Kant’s is thus, and not in the fuller sense
of giving answers to what constitutes a good and fulfilling life.53
Above, I noted that the focus on ancient versus modern liberties
neglects the ideal of internal autonomy. In order to understand the latter
dimension of freedom and how it found its way into models of deliber-
ative democracy with roots in the critical theory tradition of the Frank-
furt School, I suggest we look more closely at the theory of ideology.
The critique of ideology and internal autonomy
Recent writings on deliberative democracy have not been particularly
concerned with the critique of ideology.54 One reason for this can be
found in the synthesis between Habermasian and Rawlsian theories of
deliberative democracy. The critique of ideology does not sit well with
political liberalism.55 There are, however, still some strands in later
Habermasian writings that reveal the roots in the tradition of ideology
critique, though I think critical theorists need to demarcate themselves
more strongly from Rawlsian political liberalism than they do. There
are some elements of ideology critique that deliberative democrats could
abandon only at the cost of blunting its critical edge. And, in particular,
the critique of ideology thematizes an important dimension of freedom,
which has a tendency to fall out of view in liberal theories, namely the
free formation of political opinions or internal autonomy. To make
explicit the idea of internal autonomy, I go back to the earlier Habermas
as well as to other writings on ideology. It is crucial in light of the concern
for multiple dimensions of freedom, however, not to base ideology
critique on perfectionism or a conception of the good; rather, it should
be based on reasons of justification. The acceptance of ideology critique,
moreover, means we must give a stronger weight to political freedom,
because we otherwise fall into paternalism.
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Which understanding of freedom does the theory of ideology entail?56
When we speak about the oppressive effects of ideology, we are con-
cerned not with external but with internal obstacles to emancipation,
at least in the first instance. Our lack of freedom when we are ideo-
logically delusioned has not so much to do with the external world (that
we cannot do something because others – or nature – prevent us from
doing it), as with our own beliefs and desires. Hence, ideology dimin-
ishes internal autonomy.
Ideology can block emancipation either because it has the result that
we do not believe things should be different than they are or that we do
not think they could be different. In the latter case, ideological delusion
means ‘that the agents’ form of consciousness is artificially limited, i.e.
that they suffer from restrictions on what they can perceive as real
possibilities for themselves’.57 The first form of ideology makes certain
relations and conditions appear legitimate. This might be the most
obvious form of ideology. It is the form of ideology that Marxists speak
of when they say that bourgeois ideology makes capitalist relations of
production appear legitimate. Marx’s labor theory of value and exploita-
tion has a critical intent in so far as it shows that the relationship
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat was not a free and equal
form of exchange, as it was claimed to be in bourgeois ideology.58
Ideologies do not only function by legitimizing certain relationships
and institutions but also by reifying them, i.e. by making them seem
‘“natural” and thus, ineradicable, unavoidable, and unalterable’.59 When
Habermas in the late 1960s described science and technology as (a new
form of) ideology, he saw them as having this second function. He saw
science and technology not as explicit forms of legitimation, not as what
we might call moral ideologies. They do not – as bourgeois ideology does
– include norms and values, which can justify certain developments.
Rather, they are precisely characterized by a professed value-freedom,
promoted by the epistemological theory of positivism. It is exactly the
bracketing of moral questions that makes science an ideology.60 This
new ideology ‘is distinguished from its predecessor in that it severs the
criteria for justifying the organization of social life from any normative
regulation of interaction, thus depoliticizing them’.61 This form of ideol-
ogy still has legitimating power, albeit an implicit one.62 No one objects
to or questions the natural and inevitable.
‘The point of a theory of ideology is that agents are sometimes
suffering from a coercion of which they are not immediately aware.’63
As such, it relies on a dimension of freedom hidden to the liberal theorist.
Liberalism can be the basis of one form of critique based on its under-
standing of freedom, namely critique of institutions that rely on direct
interference with our actions and choices beyond those that harm others.
But this is too limited. Ideology critique with its implied idea of internal
autonomy gets at two closely related issues that we cannot get at from
720
Philosophy & Social Criticism 34 (7)
 © 2008 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at Copenhagen University Library on August 18, 2008 http://psc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
the perspective of social criticism based on the dimension of negative
freedom alone. First, the fact that there are no external constraints on
an action is not sufficient for my being free to do it, as I may be prevented
from choosing to do it by my form of consciousness, by my constella-
tion of beliefs and desires.64 To be free to do what one wants does not
cover all dimensions of freedom. If I am not also free to do want what I
want, or if my very wants are shaped unfreely, I still lack freedom in the
sense of internal autonomy. The person who is ideologically constrained
cannot be said to be unfree from the perspective of Hobbes’ or Berlin’s
notion of freedom, since she or he finds no obstacles to doing what she
or he wants.65 The point of ideology critique is that there is more to be
said about freedom, more questions that need to be asked. We want not
merely to ask whether there were any external obstacles to an omitted
action, such as legal restrictions, but also whether the individual came
to his or her conclusions whether to perform the action or not freely. So
if a certain group or class of people, for example, does not run for office,
we do not merely ask whether there is legal discrimination that prevents
them from doing so, but also whether their own self-understanding is
freely formed, whether they based their decision (or non-decision) on
good reasons. The theory of ideology rejects the answer that if someone
does not do something to which there are no external obstacles, then
there are no objections in terms of freedom. There is another dimension
of freedom we should be concerned with: internal autonomy.66
The second aspect made clear by the theory of ideology, while
neglected by the negative freedom perspective, is that freedom is not
only limited by the interference of others but might be self-imposed. ‘The
agents in a society impose coercive institutions on themselves by parti-
cipating in them, accepting them without protest, etc. Simply by acting
in an apparently “free” way according to the dictates of their world-
picture, the agents reproduce relations of coercion.’67 The notion of nega-
tive freedom has nothing to say to such situations, because people in a
sense are not prevented from doing what they want. They consent to
their situation and hence must be free from a liberal perspective. Negative
freedom, thus, is not a sufficiently broad conception of freedom for a
critical theory; it is only a conception of one dimension of freedom.
The Rawlsian adherence to the negative freedom tradition and its
commitment to not criticizing comprehensive doctrines make political
liberalism incapable of approaching the dimension of freedom manifest
in the theory of ideology. Rawls explicitly rejects the critique of ideology:
We should not readily accuse one another of self- or group-interest, preju-
dice or bias, and of such deeply entrenched errors as ideological blindness
and delusion. Such accusations arouse resentment and hostility, and block
the way to reasonable agreement. The disposition to make such accusa-
tions without compelling grounds is plainly unreasonable, and often a
declaration of intellectual war.68
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By taking this stance, Rawls excludes the possibility of investigating
whether reasonable comprehensive doctrines and the overlapping con-
sensus between them could not be such world-views that inadvertently
reproduce relations of coercion. If there is no probing of citizens’ compre-
hensive views in deliberation, then there is no non-violent way in which
a check may be made whether the policies and institutions they support
are defensible. For the sake of stability, Rawls advances what could be
seen as a strategy of depoliticization.
We should not disregard Rawls’ point that charges of ideological
delusion might create resentment, however. Jack Knight and James
Johnson are too quick in dismissing Rawls on this issue:
It very plausibly is among the desirable features of democratic deliberation
that it allows participants to raise [the possibility that some are deluded by
ideology], to challenge those to whom they believe the charge applies, to
do so publicly and, thereby, to afford those so challenged to respond.69
Knight and Johnson reduce ideology to other forms of error and self-
interest. In the Marxist and critical theory tradition, however, ideology
is something more systemic. Not all cases of persons being wrong about
what they can get and what they want are cases of ideological delusion.
There are many other sorts of mistakes than those caused by ideology.70
The critique of ideology is only concerned with beliefs and desires that
are systematically distorted by the circumstances under which they are
formed.71 In the Habermasian version, the concern is systematically
distorted communication since it maintains that communication is the
processes in which we form our beliefs and desires.72 Moreover, ideology
critique is not directed immediately at certain people’s beliefs but rather
at the conditions under which these beliefs are formed and at the general
structure of communication. Ideology critique does not need to challenge
specific people with being deluded – something Rawls probably is right
to say would create resentment and undermine rather than promote
deliberation – but intends to suggest that the conditions under which all
of us form our beliefs are distorting. That is, it aims to show that there
is a problem with the general structure of communication in our society.
The connection between ideology critique and deliberation, then, is not
that we in deliberation can charge each other with being ideologically
deluded (as Knight and Johnson hold), but that we need non-distorted
deliberation in order to overcome our ideological one-sidedness.
Moreover, ideology critique rejects the idealistic notion that we can
overcome ideology merely through critically discussing it.73 Ideologies
do not disappear until the power structures that uphold them are
dissolved. However, from the perspective of deliberative democracy that
I am advancing – as committed to multiple dimensions of freedom – the
critique of ideology must begin with critical discussion, but this is a
discussion aimed at changing the structures that uphold ideology.
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The problem with ideology is that it excludes certain issues from
being publicly discussed at all. The call for a more deliberative demo-
cracy on this view is a call for politicization, politicization in the sense
of opening up for reflection the practical-moral sides of our relation-
ships and the conditions under which we live. Increased deliberation
aimed at overcoming ideology does not require that we question each
other’s deepest motives.74 What matters is that the validity of the beliefs
is being probed in a free and non-distorted manner. Thus, we can accept
Rawls’ statement that it is wrong in public deliberation to charge others
with being ideologically deluded. The disagreement with Rawls is that
he excludes certain basic questions from reflection and deliberation. If
certain issues are not discussed at all, we have no way of knowing if
they are valid nor whether they are freely held.
When we contrast the earlier Habermas with Rawls, the former’s
critique of depoliticization stands out. Habermas’ critique of the ideology
of science and technology owes much to earlier critical theory, in particu-
lar Herbert Marcuse.75 The critique of depoliticization is a critique of
the way in which moral and political questions are turned into technical
ones and of the concomitant idea of decisionism; the belief that moral
questions are incapable of truth and hence ‘cannot be discussed cogently
[but] in the final instance must be decided upon, one way or another’.76
Decisionist politics stands, of course, in the sharpest contrast to delib-
erative politics. Decisionism denies what the idea of public deliberation
confirms, that normative questions can be rationally discussed and that
some solutions are better than others are.
A main contrast between Habermas’ and Rawlsian models of delib-
erative democracy today concerns whether public deliberation should be
concerned with truth-claims. Habermas’ insistence on seeing deliberation
as about truth and not merely about the politically reasonable could be
seen as having its roots in his critique of the depoliticizing tendencies of
technocracy and positivism. From the perspective of the early Habermas,
the importance of deliberation is exactly that it politicizes or makes the
object of reflection what is seen as natural or what is otherwise excluded
from questioning. Rawlsian deliberative democracy clearly does not share
the ethical decisionism of positivism; nevertheless, by excluding funda-
mental issues from deliberation, it might have the same depoliticizing
effects.
The aim of ideology critique: triggering self-reflection
From the perspective of deliberative democracy as committed to multiple
dimensions of freedom, we should limit the aim of deliberation and
critique to what matters for justification of public policies and law, which
is not the same as limiting topics that can be discussed. We are con-
cerned only with the free formation of beliefs regarding issues of common
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concern and not with how people form their views of the good life, at
least not insofar as the latter can be separated from processes of justifi-
cation. In Rainer Forst’s words, ‘Critical theory . . . is a critique of existing
“relations of justification” as the presupposition for establishing and
developing a justified basic structure of society’.77 To Forst’s formulation,
it should be added that hidden relations of justification of ideological
character are included. The critique, then, is not perfectionist in the sense
of being concerned with whether people live examined lives and criti-
cally scrutinize their private life-projects. It is concerned with people’s
internal autonomy only insofar as it affects how public policies and laws
are justified and legitimized. Of course, there might be (and most likely
is) a causal relationship between free formation of opinions in processes
of justification of political-moral norms and citizens’ views of their own
good, but the normative commitment to internal autonomy is indepen-
dent of such an effect.
We should distinguish between critique being directed at what the
ideology says (its content) and how it came into being; that is, between
the epistemic properties of its composite beliefs and its genetic proper-
ties.78 The critical theorist who wants to make a criticism based on the
epistemic properties of the ideology alone needs an independent standard,
a correct answer, to which he or she can compare the constituent beliefs
of the ideology. Such an approach would violate an important dimen-
sion of freedom, the freedom of the agents to think for themselves. If,
on the other hand, the criticism were directed at the genesis of the ideol-
ogy alone, it might be asked why it matters how an ideology came into
being if its constituent beliefs are correct and do not support oppressive
institutions (the genetic fallacy).79
In Habermas, we find an approach that combines criticism directed
at genesis and at epistemic properties.80 It is exactly by – and only by
– analyzing how a specific form of legitimation or justification came into
being that we can know whether it can be presumed to be right or not.
If processes of legitimation are systematically distorted, then their results
are ideological and epistemically dubious. ‘Ideology on this definition is
. . . the result of asymmetric communication, where asymmetries can
include ones that result from information, power, status and role, and
cultural differences.’81 The critique of ideology is therefore aimed at that
which distorts communication. The content or epistemic properties of the
beliefs of the addressees, therefore, are not the direct aim of ideology crit-
ique. The proceduralism of Habermas’ approach entails that we cannot
have any rational presumptions about what are true or false beliefs
except as results of processes of deliberation free from domination. The
advantage of this approach is that the theorist does not and cannot take
the paternalistic role of the philosopher expert who comes down from
Mount Olympus to tell people what is right or wrong. Rather, what has
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the presumption of being right and wrong must be determined through
practices of common deliberation. The weakness of this approach is that
we might never get to deliberation free from domination, or at least it
is not a reality now. Thus a possibility is to speak of hypothetical deliber-
ation. This is Habermas’ approach in Legitimation Crisis, where he says
that a social theory critical of ideology ‘compares normative structures
existing at a given time with the hypothetical state of a system of norms
formed, ceteris paribus, discursively’.82 But this solution cancels the
advantages in terms of freedom of the proceduralist approach. If the
theorist could know what would result from free deliberation, then there
would be no need for actual and common deliberation.83 If ideology
critique is to be compatible with the normative commitments of delib-
erative democracy (the multiple dimensions of freedom) and be able to
contribute to their realization, it should avoid pre-empting actual pro-
cesses of deliberation. Instead, it should play the role of provoking such
processes of deliberation by initiating processes of self-reflection.
To be true to the normative commitments of deliberative democracy
in general and in order to avoid paternalism in particular, it is crucial,
then, to distinguish between the theory of ideology as a way of showing
people what their real interests are and as a means of triggering self-
reflection.84 The first view requires that the theorist knows what real
interests are from some external point of view and hence is incompatible
with the proceduralism that I think should be the core of deliberative
democracy and which is the only way to protect the dimension of freedom
involved in the right to think for oneself. The second view is compatible
with proceduralism and with a conception of freedom that sees freedom
as a matter of individuals coming to insights by their own efforts as
participants in processes of public deliberation. As James Bohman has
argued, critical theorists should participate as critics in the public sphere.
The claims they make ‘are successful not in so far as they bring agents
to particular true insights, but rather in so far as they initiate processes
of self-reflection, the outcome of which agents determine for them-
selves’.85 Critical theory should not say that people are deluded, but make
them consider whether they are so. This is done by provoking them to
participate in processes of public deliberation.
Thus, the aim of ideology critique is emancipation from a specific
form of oppression and is achieved via processes of self-reflection.86 An
important point in this connection is that the first step is not to remove
coercion and oppression: for example, an oppressive state and an exploita-
tive market economy. The first step is for people themselves to realize
that the present institutions are not in fact in the common interest.87 It
is only if people themselves realize that their present situation is unjust
and then overturn it that this change can happen democratically and in
accordance with the deliberative commitment to political freedom.
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Ideology and political freedom
A theory of ideology along the lines briefly sketched here should be inti-
mately related to a concern for political freedom; first, because ideology
is related to legitimation; second because the critique of ideology to avoid
paternalism cannot rely on negative freedom alone but must focus also
on the common exercise of political freedom. The critique of ideology
shows how we uphold certain institutions with our active support or
with mere compliance. One point of the theory of ideology is that politi-
cal institutions and social relations are upheld by constellations of
beliefs and desires – or by certain structures of communication, and not
merely by violence. Indeed, successful ideological domination means
that there is no need to use violence at all because the subjects accept
the structures. And as such, oppression is in a sense self-imposed or at
least reproduced by ourselves. Here there is no possible criticism from
the perspective of negative freedom and the concomitant consent theory;
we need to go deeper, to another dimension of freedom. The question
raised from the perspective of the critique of ideology is how political
authority legitimizes itself. The critique of ideology is a critique of certain
forms of legitimation. In the Habermasian version, it is specifically a
critique of forms of legitimation that take place by limiting communi-
cation, i.e. by excluding some claims from being discussed.88 Processes
of legitimation in order to be non-ideological need to be free from domi-
nation, and this is exactly how we should define the aim of deliberative
democracy. In Bohman’s words, ‘democracy is also a particular struc-
ture of communication’.89
It is a crucial lesson – and one sometimes overlooked by its critics
– that deliberative democracy is not merely a call for more communi-
cation but a call for a particular structure of communication – namely
one free from distortion and domination. When the roots in the theory
of ideology are forgotten or abandoned, this important point tends to
fall out of view. A common misunderstanding of deliberative democracy
is that it sees any agreement reached on the basis of talk as good.90But
clearly, language is not only a medium of reaching free agreements; it
can also be used as a means of domination, exclusion, and social power.
And proponents of deliberative democracy, at least those coming out of
the tradition of critical theory, are or should be well aware of this. The
way to understand language as a medium of domination is exactly via
the critique of ideology.91 Part of the misunderstanding – and delibera-
tive democrats themselves are not without fault in this – is that the aim
of deliberation is always to go from disagreement to agreement, and
that if there is agreement there is no problem.92 But if agreement is the
product of ideological domination, then the aim of deliberation is to
show that the agreement is only apparent or that it is not the product
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of free deliberation.93 To see this, deliberative democrats should not
forget their roots in critical theory and the importance of the critique
of ideology.
The critique of ideology should also be related to political freedom
in order to avoid paternalism. In his discussion with Rawls, Habermas
writes that philosophy ‘must avoid equally the uncritical affirmation of
the status quo and the assumption of a paternalistic role’.94 The tradi-
tional liberal critical standard and solution to the danger of paternalism
is negative freedom. We avoid a paternalistic state and paternalistic co-
citizens, according to this view, by giving citizens equal rights to deter-
mine and live according to their own ideas. But negative freedom is not
sufficient when we have become aware of the problem of ideology. In
this respect Habermasian critical theory is more ambitious than Rawlsian
political liberalism.95 It is so because it does not leave people’s compre-
hensive views outside politics or outside political philosophy. It criticizes
them. Here we see that Habermas has not left the critique of ideology
entirely behind. But for this reason Habermas might also be regarded
as in greater danger of succumbing to paternalism than Rawls is.
The difference between critical theory and Rawls is not that the first
sees the importance of social circumstances while the other does not.
Rawls, of course, is not a libertarian who thinks formal liberties are suffi-
cient. Rawls is also aware that social conditions affect our preferences.96
And he advocates giving fair value to political liberties.97 But there is
an important difference between Rawls’ worth of freedom argument and
the one regarding internal autonomy. The first is concerned with giving
people objectively fair conditions in order to make their formal freedoms
worth their nominal value. The second is concerned with self-reflection
on the basis of which citizens themselves can overturn oppressive insti-
tutions and unjust social conditions. Rawls’ perspective is purely external,
while the critical theory perspective takes the perspective of a participant
and makes the change of circumstances dependent upon that it can be
accepted in the exercise of political freedom, i.e. in processes of public
deliberation. This latter route is closed to Rawls, because he sees it as
a violation of the principle of toleration to discuss people’s comprehen-
sive views. He is therefore forced to go directly to implementing social
justice. Thus, opposite to what one might expect, it is Rawls who turns
out to be the paternalist and not the critical theorist with his or her basis
in ideology critique.
Habermas’ answer to the problem of paternalism is proceduralism
and an emphasis on political freedom.98 But Habermas does not mention
in this connection the third dimension of freedom, the free formation of
one’s beliefs and desires that I have stressed. It is possible that Habermas
sees this dimension as included in his notion of public autonomy; indeed,
it must be. But we need to highlight this dimension of freedom in order
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to make explicit the difference with Rawls. When Habermas and Rawls
discuss who best accommodates both ancient and modern liberties, the
internal autonomy dimension falls out of view. Now, if Habermas would
wish to see internal autonomy as part and parcel of public autonomy,
then he should have seen that what distinguishes him and Rawls is not
the weight they give to negative and political freedom, respectively, but
that they view political autonomy in different ways. And Rawls should
have seen the same. The crucial difference from a Rawlsian perspective
is not that Habermas gives too much weight to political freedom, but
that Habermas sees the free formation of one’s comprehensive views
(insofar as they affect political legitimation) as part of what the exercise
of political freedom entails. I have separated the third dimension of
freedom in order to make this clear. But I agree that internal autonomy
only matters insofar as it affects processes of legitimation – and not
when it bears only on issues of the good life. Internal autonomy should
be part of political freedom also in the way that it is only people them-
selves in the process of deliberation who can determine whether or not
something really is in their interest.
Conclusion
Because of their starting point in the fact of reasonable pluralism and
the consequences they draw from it, Rawlsian deliberative democrats
undermine the enlightenment and emancipatory potentials of processes
of public deliberation. The Rawlsians draw deliberative democracy in an
unfortunate uncritical direction and confuse what the potentials of public
deliberation are. The one-dimensional concern for accommodation of
citizens with different and incompatible comprehensive doctrines excludes
the possibility that freedom might be enhanced by critical discussion of
fundamental differences in world-views. The importance of the free
formation of political opinions, of internal autonomy, falls out of view
from the perspective of political liberalism. The content reasonableness
required by Rawlsians in the exercise of public reason shows a concern,
not with the free and enlightened formation of political opinions, but
with protecting citizens from having their fundamental ideas discussed.
If we want to understand deliberative democracy as a critical theory
of contemporary society – as I have argued we ought to do – we should
resist the synthesis between Rawlsian and Habermasian deliberative
democracy. The strength of deliberation is not merely to accommodate
and uphold existing differences but to initiate processes of reflection
about policies and institutions that are uncritically accepted by most
people. Hence, the starting point for deliberative democracy should not
be ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism’ but rather ‘the fact of unreflective
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acquiescence’. The aim of public deliberation should not merely be
accommodation but emancipation. Rawlsian deliberative democrats are
so afraid of offending people that they close off the potential of compre-
hensive deliberation to achieve its emancipatory aims. People’s com-
prehensive doctrines are sometimes intrinsically linked to their acceptance
of injustices in society. The Habermasians, on their side, have followed
the liberals too far and forgotten their roots in the critique of ideology
and what I have emphasized as a third dimension of freedom, internal
autonomy.
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Notes
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 28–31 August 2003. I
would like to thank Elizabeth H. Ellis and Michael Lipscomb for their
comments on that occasion. I am also grateful for comments from Jean Cohen,
Jon Elster, and Pablo Gilabert.
1 Even though many of the ideas that today are seen as central to delibera-
tive democracy can be found in the earlier works of Habermas and Rawls,
not until recently have they both explicitly joined the ranks of adherents.
Habermas first develops an explicit theory of deliberative democracy in his
Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge: Polity, 1996[1992]),
but as early as 1962, in his The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere, trans. T. Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1989), he had brought up
central concerns of what later was to be called deliberative democracy, such
as publicity, rational argumentation, etc. The theory of communicative
action and discourse ethics can also be seen as being prolegomena to the
theory of deliberative democracy; see The Theory of Communicative Action,
vols I–II, trans. T. McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984, 1987) and
‘Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification’, in
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and
S. Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). The first time Rawls
identifies his idea of public reason as belonging to the theory of delibera-
tive democracy is in 1997, in his ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, re-
printed in his Collected Papers, ed. S. Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999), pp. 579f., though he also mentions the relation in
‘Reply to Habermas’, Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995): 132–80, at 133
n. 1 and 177f.
2 Joshua Cohen’s influential 1989 article, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legit-
imacy’, draws heavily on both Rawls and Habermas. (It was reprinted in
Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Democracy, ed. J. Bohman
729
Rostbøll: Emancipation or accommodation
PSC
 © 2008 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at Copenhagen University Library on August 18, 2008 http://psc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
and W. Rehg [Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1997].) In his later articles, however,
Cohen draws less on Habermas and more on Rawls (who, in his later
writings, is in turn influenced by Joshua Cohen). See ‘Procedure and Sub-
stance in Deliberative Democracy’, in ibid. and ‘Democracy and Liberty’,
in Deliberative Democracy, ed. J. Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998). In his ‘On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation’, Political
Theory 15(3) (1987): 338–68 (347ff.), Bernard Manin, by contrast, sees
Rawls of A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973) as
an example of a non-deliberative view, because in the original position there
are no differences between the parties and hence no reason for common
deliberation.
3 Habermas, ‘Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason’, in The
Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. C. Cronin and P. De
Greiff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), p. 50.
4 Rawls is also a neo-Kantian of sorts, but his turn to political liberalism is
a turn away from a commitment to Kantian autonomy.
5 J. Donald Moon, ‘Rawls and Habermas on Public Reason: Human Rights
and Global Justice’, Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003): 257–74,
also notes the very different traditions Rawls and Habermas stem from but
without discussing their views of freedom.
6 This discussion was commissioned by The Journal of Philosophy and
published in vol. XCII (1995).
7 Joshua Cohen also focuses on the relationship between ancient and modern
liberties; see ‘Procedure and Substance’, pp. 409–12.
8 Habermas, ‘Reconciliation’, pp. 69ff.; ‘“Reasonable” versus “True,” or the
Morality of Worldviews’, in The Inclusion of the Other, p. 100f.; Rawls,
‘Reply to Habermas’, 168f. On this difference between Rawls and Habermas,
see also Frank Michelman, ‘How Can the People Ever Make the Laws?’,
in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, ed. J. Bohman
and W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), and Samuel Freeman,
‘Deliberative Democracy: a Sympathetic Comment’, Philosophy and Public
Affairs 29(4) (Fall 2000): 371–418 (413ff.).
9 The most ambitious attempt at such reconciliation is Habermas, Between
Facts and Norms. It is also an aspiration for John Rawls; see Political
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 4f.; references
to this text will be given in the text as PL; I have used the 1993 edition
except for the ‘Introduction to the Paperback Edition’ of 1996. Joshua
Cohen, too, has this aspiration; he makes two quite different arguments
for it in ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’ and in ‘Procedure and
Substance’.
10 Cf. Christian F. Rostbøll, ‘Preferences and Paternalism: On Freedom and
Deliberative Democracy’, Political Theory 33(3) (June 2005): 370–96.
11 Other proponents of deliberative democracy have recently noted and
lamented the uncritical direction the theory has taken and urged a return
to critical theory. See John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond:
Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000),
pp. 2f., 20ff.; Iris M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), p. 10f. and ‘Activist Challenges to Deliberative
730
Philosophy & Social Criticism 34 (7)
 © 2008 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at Copenhagen University Library on August 18, 2008 http://psc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Democracy’, Political Theory 29(5) (2001): 670–90; William E. Scheuerman,
‘Between Radicalism and Resignation: Democratic Theory in Habermas’
Between Facts and Norms’, in Habermas: A Critical Reader, ed. P. Dews
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).
12 I have attempted to develop such a theory of freedom in Christian F. Rostbøll,
Deliberative Freedom: Deliberative Democracy as a Critical Theory (Albany,
NY: SUNY Press, 2008).
13 Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback edn (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996), pp. xxxvii–viii. The idea of reasonable pluralism also plays a
central role in Joshua Cohen’s articles from the 1990s; see, for example,
Joshua Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance’ and ‘Democracy and Liberty’.
But ‘reasonable pluralism’ is absent from Cohen’s influential 1989 ‘Deliber-
ation and Democratic Legitimacy’.
14 Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance’, p. 408f.; Cohen, ‘Democracy and
Liberty’, p. 187ff.; Rawls, Political Liberalism, passim.
15 Note that the disagreement is about the reasons behind the norms guiding
our common life, not about the norms themselves. Regarding the latter,
Rawls believes there can be an overlapping consensus among reasonable
comprehensive doctrines. See Political Liberalism, Lecture IV, pp. 133ff.
16 See also Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’, p. 136.
17 As also noted by Habermas, ‘Reconciliation’, p. 67.
18 William Galston distinguishes Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism,
where the former is concerned with diversity and the latter with autonomy.
According to Galston’s definitions, autonomy is ‘linked with the commit-
ment to sustained rational examination of self, other, and social practices’;
diversity means ‘legitimate differences among individuals and groups over
such matters as the nature of the good life, sources of moral authority,
reason versus faith, and the like’. William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 21.
19 See also Rawls, ‘Public Reason Revisited’, p. 611.
20 See also Cohen, ‘Democracy and Liberty’, pp. 188ff.
21 For Madison’s discussion of faction, see Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison, and John Jay, Federalist Papers, ed. C. Rossiter (New York:
Mentor, 1999), no. 10, esp. p. 46.
22 Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’, p. 145.
23 Though they can do so in the background culture. Criticism of Rawls for
wanting to constrain civil society discussions is misdirected since public
reason does not apply to what he calls the background culture. Rawls’
public forum should not be confused with Habermas’ public sphere. See
Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’, p. 140, n. 13; Rawls, ‘Public Reason Re-
visited’, pp. 575f., 608; Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 220, 249; and
Charles Larmore, ‘Public Reason’, in Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed.
S. Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 381f. On
the other hand, this means that Rawls has no theory of deliberation in the
informal public sphere, which is a serious shortcoming for a theory of delib-
erative democracy.
24 The preceding argument borrows from Habermas, ‘“Reasonable” versus
“True”’, pp. 83–5, 93.
731
Rostbøll: Emancipation or accommodation
 © 2008 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at Copenhagen University Library on August 18, 2008 http://psc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
25 Rawls, however, goes beyond the negative freedom tradition by emphasiz-
ing the economic conditions that secure ‘the worth of freedom’. See below.
26 Similarly, Nadia Urbinati has argued that deliberative practices (and Mill’s
conception of liberty) cannot be understood in terms of Berlin’s theory of
two liberties. Urbinati, Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to
Representative Government (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
2002), pp. 1, 10, 12, 155ff.
27 Cf. Freeman, ‘Deliberative Democracy: a Sympathetic Comment’, pp. 405ff.
For Habermasian criticisms of content reasonableness constraints, see
Seyla Benhabib, ‘Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’,
in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political,
ed. S. Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Priceton University Press, 1996), pp. 74ff.;
Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, pp. 42ff.; Habermas, Between
Facts and Norms, p. 308.
28 Rawls, ‘Public Reason Revisited’, p. 578.
29 ibid.
30 Jack Knight and James Johnson make a similar point; see ‘What Sort of
Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?’, in Deliberative Demo-
cracy. Essays on Reason and Politics, ed. J. Bohman and W. Rehg
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 286f.
31 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, trans. D. A. Cress (Indi-
anapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987), bk IV, ch. 2, p. 82.
32 For a good argument for incorporating self-interests as a legitimate aspect
of deliberation, see Jane Mansbridge, ‘Practice–Thought–Practice’, in
Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participa-
tory Governance, ed. A. Fung and E. O. Wright (London: Verso, 2003),
pp. 179–88. On how moving from purely self-regarding preferences to
generalizable interests involves a process, see Habermas’ description of how
generalizable interests ‘emerge step by step’ in ‘the course of successively
undertaken abstractions’. ‘Reconciliation’, p. 58; and Manin, who says:
‘the structure of the deliberative system usually makes the protagonist strive
to enlarge their points of view and propose more and more general
positions. There is a sort of competition for generality.’ See ‘On Legitimacy
and Political Deliberation’, p. 359.
33 Whether there is a conflict between these two dimensions of freedom is an
issue to which I return. It seems Rawls thinks there is, since he wants to
protect citizens from the discussion of their comprehensive views in the
public forum.
34 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 52.
Or as Rawls puts it, public reason ‘is a view about the kind of reasons on
which citizens are to rest their political cases in making their political justi-
fications to one another when they support laws and policies that invoke
the coercive powers of government concerning fundamental political ques-
tions’; ‘Public Reason Revisited’, p. 603. I would group Gutmann and
Thompson as Rawlsian deliberative democrats, but it should be noted that
they allow greater inclusion of comprehensive views in public deliberation
than Rawls does. On this, see Dennis F. Thompson, ‘Public Reason and
732
Philosophy & Social Criticism 34 (7)
 © 2008 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at Copenhagen University Library on August 18, 2008 http://psc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Precluded Reasons’, Fordham Law Review 72(5) (April 2004): 2073–88,
esp. 2083f.
35 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, I, p. 24.
36 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, II, p. 277; Habermas,
‘Discourse Ethics’, 58; Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and
Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 486.
37 Habermas, it should be emphasized, would not see a virtue like reason-
ableness as the solution to the problem of distorted communication; see
further below.
38 Jon Elster notes that arguing, bargaining, and voting are the three ways in
which decisions can be reached in modern societies. See his ‘Introduction’,
in Deliberative Democracy, ed. J. Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), pp. 5f. Others have argued for the inclusion of humor,
greetings, testimony, storytelling, and so on, as legitimate parts of the delib-
erative process. These, however, are not forms of decision-making, though
they do affect opinion formation. For alternative forms of communication,
see Young, Inclusion and Democracy, ch. 2.
39 Cf. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, pp. 162–8, esp. pp. 166f.
40 The most important work here is still The Theory of Communicative Action,
but see also Between Facts and Norms, pp. 151–68, where Habermas
makes it clear that deliberative democracy cannot rely on argumentation
as the only form of communication, but must allow also, for example, for
bargaining. See, in addition, ‘Three Normative Models of Democracy’, in
The Inclusion of the Other, ed. C. Cronin and P. De Greiff (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1998), p. 245: ‘The concept of deliberative politics acquires
empirical relevance only when we take into account the multiplicity of forms
of communication in which a common will is produced, that is, not just
ethical self-clarification but also the balancing of interests and compromise,
the purposive choice of means, moral justification, and legal consistency-
testing.’
41 Cf. Christian F. Rostbøll, ‘Dissent, Criticism, and Transformative Political
Action in Deliberative Democracy’, Critical Review of International Social
and Political Philosophy (forthcoming).
42 In Between Facts and Norms, pp. 340–1, Habermas emphasizes that ‘one
should seek the conditions for a rational political will-formation not only
at the individual level of the orientation and decisions of single actors but
also at the social level of institutionalized processes of deliberation and
decision making’. And in his discussion with Rawls, Habermas proposes
‘that philosophy limit itself to the clarification of the moral point of view
and the procedure of democratic legitimation, to the analysis of the
conditions of rational discourses and negotiations’. ‘Reconciliation’, p. 72;
emphases added.
43 Habermas, ‘“Reasonable” versus “True”’, p. 101.
44 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 135.
45 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Further Reflections on the Public Sphere’, in C. Calhoun
(ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992),
pp. 441ff.
46 Habermas, ‘“Reasonable” versus “True”’, p. 97.
733
Rostbøll: Emancipation or accommodation
 © 2008 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at Copenhagen University Library on August 18, 2008 http://psc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
47 For a criticism of philosophers who impose their ideas on citizens from
without, see Michael Walzer, ‘Philosophy and Democracy’, Political Theory
9(3) (1981): 379–99.
48 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. xli.
49 Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’, pp. 135f.
50 Habermas has, of course, much to say that relates to democratic theory in
his works in the 30 years between The Structural Transformation and
Between Facts and Norms, but it is only with the latter work that he
develops a comprehensive democratic theory.
51 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, pp. 445f.
52 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 77ff.
53 Habermas, ‘“Reasonable” versus “True”’, pp. 98ff.
54 An exception is James Bohman; see his Public Deliberation (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1996), ch. 5; and ‘“When Water Chokes”: Ideology,
Communication, and Practical Rationality’, Constellations 7(3) (September
2000): 382–92. This lack of concern with ideology is also noted and
regretted (but not made good) by Iris Young; see her ‘Activist Challenges
to Deliberative Democracy’, p. 686.
55 Rawls directly rejects that ideology critique has a legitimate role in public
deliberation; see below.
56 For a recent article that gives a good, systematic overview of the literature
on ideology, see Tommie Shelby, ‘Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social
Theory’, The Philosophical Forum XXXIV (Summer 2003): 153–88. The
best book on Habermas and ideology is, to my knowledge, Raymond
Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981). I have learned much from Geuss’ excellent study and draw
upon it in my discussion of ideology below. Geuss notes that ideology
critique and critical theory depend ‘crucially on a theory of freedom and
coercion’, p. 78.
57 ibid., 83.
58 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. B. Fowkes (Harmondsworth, Mx:
Penguin, 1990); see Part I, ch. 1 for the labor theory of value and Part III
on surplus value and exploitation.
59 Shelby, ‘Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory’, p. 177. On reifica-
tion, see also Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, II, p. 355.
60 See Jürgen Habermas, ‘Technology and Science as “Ideology”’, in Toward a
Rational Society (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1970), and Jürgen Habermas,
Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 303.
61 Habermas, ‘Technology and Science as “Ideology”’, p. 112.
62 ibid., 105.
63 Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, p. 78.
64 Geuss gives such a definition of ideology as a form of consciousness, The
Idea of a Critical Theory, p. 12. Bohman rejects that ideology is ‘false
consciousness’, it is rather ‘the result of asymmetric communication’; see
‘“When Water Chokes”’, p. 385. But to say what something is the result
of is not to give an alternative to what it is. And, as Shelby notes, ‘ideolo-
gies cannot have their peculiar and profound social impact without being
received into the consciousness of human beings’. ‘Ideology, Racism, and
734
Philosophy & Social Criticism 34 (7)
 © 2008 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at Copenhagen University Library on August 18, 2008 http://psc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Critical Social Theory’, p. 157. Habermas also sees (saw?) ideology as a
form of consciousness, ‘technocratic consciousness’, see ‘Technology and
Science as “Ideology”’, p. 107.
65 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996),
ch. XXI and Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Four Essays on
Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 122ff.
66 In her empirical study of town meeting government in ‘Selby’, Jane
Mansbridge found ‘the absence of legal barriers leads most Selby citizens
to look on participation or nonparticipation as only a matter of choice.
Many townspeople believe, for instance, that holding town office depends
primarily on one’s willingness to take the job.’ See Beyond Adversary
Democracy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 115. Here,
of course, there might be a certain freedom ideology at play. Everyone can
run for office, so what is there to complain about?
67 Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, p. 60, cf. pp. 58, 74.
68 John Rawls, ‘The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus’, in
Collected Papers, ed. S. Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1999), p. 478.
69 Knight and Johnson, ‘What Sort of Equality Does Deliberative Democracy
Require?’, p. 284.
70 Michael Rosen, ‘On Voluntary Servitude and the Theory of Ideology’,
Constellations 7(3) (2000): 393–407 (393).
71 Shelby gives a helpful list of features that distinguish ideological beliefs
from other beliefs; see ‘Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory’,
pp. 158ff.
72 For a recent discussion of this position, see Bohman, ‘“When Water Chokes”’,
esp. pp. 383f.
73 Shelby, ‘Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory’, pp. 187f.
74 This is a fear of some political liberals; see J. Donald Moon, Constructing
Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1993), pp. 91ff.
75 See Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of
Advanced Industrial Society (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1964).
76 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Dogmatism, Reason, and Decision: On Theory and
Praxis in Our Scientific Civilization’, in Theory and Practice, trans. J. Viertel
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 265.
77 Rainer Forst, ‘Justice, Reason, and Critique: Basic Concepts of Critical
Theory’, in The Handbook of Critical Theory, ed. D. Rasmussen (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1996), p. 158.
78 Cf. Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, pp. 13ff., 26ff. I leave out here
Geuss’ third possibility, functional properties.
79 On the ‘genetic fallacy’, see ibid., p. 20.
80 ibid., p. 69.
81 Bohman, ‘“When Water Chokes”’, p. 385.
82 Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, MA:
Beacon Press, 1975), p. 113.
83 For a good discussion of the issue of hypothetical versus actual deliberation
and its relationship to the charge of authoritarianism against Habermasian
735
Rostbøll: Emancipation or accommodation
 © 2008 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at Copenhagen University Library on August 18, 2008 http://psc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
discourse ethics/deliberative democracy, see Cohen and Arato, Civil Society
and Political Theory, pp. 360ff.
84 Geuss lists three kinds of statements about self-reflection that can be found
in Habermas’ writings: ‘1. Self-reflection “dissolves” a) “self-generated
objectivity,” and b) “objective illusion.” 2. Self-reflection makes the subject
aware of its genesis or origin. 3. Self-reflection operates by bringing to
consciousness unconscious determinants of action, or consciousness.’ See
The Idea of a Critical Theory, p. 61 (notes omitted).
85 James Bohman, ‘Habermas, Marxism and Social Theory: The Case for
Pluralism in Critical Social Science’, in Habermas: A Critical Reader, ed.
P. Dews (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 80.
86 In Knowledge and Human Interest, p. 310, Habermas describes self-
reflection as an ‘emancipatory cognitive interest’, which ‘releases the subject
from dependence on hypostatized powers’.
87 Cf. Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, p. 73.
88 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, pp. 112f.
89 Bohman, ‘“When Water Chokes”’, p. 387.
90 I think this is true of Adam Przeworski, ‘Deliberation and Ideological
Domination’, in Deliberative Democracy, ed. J. Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), p. 140 and Susan Stokes, ‘Pathologies of Deliber-
ation’, in ibid.
91 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 182f.; James Bohman, ‘Emancipation and
Rhetoric: The Perlocutions and Illocutions of the Social Critic’, Philosophy
and Rhetoric 21 (1988): 185–204 (192); Jay Bernstein, ‘Habermas’, in
Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy, ed. Z. Pelczynski and
J. Gray (New York: St Martins Press, 1984), pp. 409ff.
92 For criticisms of deliberative democracy based on this (mis)understanding,
see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic
Reform in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), p. 18; and Ian Shapiro, ‘Enough of Deliberation:
Politics is about Interests and Power’, in Deliberative Politics: Essays on
Democracy and Disagreement, ed. S. Macedo (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999), pp. 30–2.
93 See Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 119, who argues that inclusive
deliberation does not necessarily make agreement easier, but that it can
show that we were mistaken about something we thought to be a common
interest. Nancy Fraser makes a similar argument; see ‘Rethinking the Public
Sphere: a Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy’, in
Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. C. Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1992), p. 130.
94 Habermas, ‘“Reasonable” versus “True”’, p. 97.
95 In their 1995 discussion, Habermas raised the question of whose theory is
most modest, Rawls’ or his own; ‘Reconciliation’, pp. 72f.
96 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 269.
97 ibid., pp. 5f., 327.
98 See Habermas, ‘“Reasonable” versus “True”’, p. 95.
736
Philosophy & Social Criticism 34 (7)
 © 2008 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at Copenhagen University Library on August 18, 2008 http://psc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
